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Abstract 
 
This paper assesses the effect of economic instability on the success of the projects funded by the 
World Bank, using the outcome of the projects, which is a notation of their overall success 
determined by the Independent Evaluation Group. It has been argued in macro economic studies 
that aid effectiveness is higher in vulnerable countries, because it dampens the negative effects of 
shocks. We show that this finding is not inconsistent with the observation that the success of the 
projects is lower in an unstable environment. Indeed instability, in particular the instability of 
exports, harms aid projects as it harms the rest of the economy, while the success of projects 
decreases when the total amount of aid received increases, due to absorptive capacity limitations. 
However this decrease is slower when instability is higher, showing a positive effect of aid 
through its stabilizing impact. We find the same results keeping only the projects funded by non 
concessionary loans, which suggests that the cushioning effect of aid extends not only to aid 
funded projects but to whole sets of projects. Corroborating macro economic findings, our results 
lead to the same conclusion that more aid should be allocated to more vulnerable countries, in 
spite of the lower success of the projects in an unstable environment: project evaluations cannot 
include the macro-stabilizing effect of the aid delivered through projects. 
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1 - Introduction 
 
            This paper examines at the micro level two issues related to aid effectiveness which have 
been previously and separately considered at the macro level: whether aid effectiveness increases 
when receiving countries face exogenous shocks and decreases when the total amount of aid 
increases. The micro economic data on which the analysis relies are the success of the projects 
funded by the World Bank.  
 
 In the last ten years, a large debate on aid effectiveness has followed the Burnside and 
Dollar paper (2000) supporting the view that aid has a positive impact on growth on the condition 
that the country has sound policies and institutions. These results, criticized by many authors, are 
still the matter of keen debates (Hansen and Tarp, 2001). It has been argued that other features of 
recipient countries may have a potential impact on aid effectiveness, even more significant than 
policy and institutions. In particular macro economic studies (Guillaumont and Chauvet, 2001; 
Chauvet and Guillaumont, 2004) evidence that aid effectiveness, measured by the impact of aid 
on growth, is higher in vulnerable countries. Following these results, one would expect to find the 
same evidence at the micro economic level. However most practicians would agree that projects 
are harder to carry out in an unstable environment which at first sight seems to be in contradiction 
with the previous findings.  
 
The apparent paradox results from the fact that the stabilizing effect of aid is hardly 
perceived at a micro economic level. We can consider this effect as a positive externality since 
each project evaluation does not include the stabilization brought by the project itself, but is 
affected by the stabilization resulting from the whole amount of aid received by the country. 
According to the quoted macro economic finding, instability (vulnerability) as such is a negative 
factor on growth, while aid dampens this effect. Correspondingly, we expect instability to lower 
the average return to the projects, but all the less that aid is higher.  
 
The results presented in this paper show that the instability of exports harms project 
outcomes, as it harms the rest of the economy, while the success of the projects decreases with 
the total amount of aid received, due to absorptive capacity limitations. But we also find that this 
decrease is slower when instability is higher. For extremely high levels of instability it can even 
be reversed, leading to an increasing return to aid. Thus the present paper also meets the burning 
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question of limited absorptive capacity, which to a large extent is linked to decreasing marginal 
returns of aid.  
 
Following Kaufmann and Wang (1995), Isham, Kaufmann and Pritchett (1997), Isham 
and Kaufmann (1999) and Levin and Dollar (2005), we use data from the projects funded by the 
World Bank and evaluated by the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) of the World Bank. 
Whereas these four studies support the view that better policies and institutions result in a higher 
economic rate of return and a higher probability of success of projects, we provide micro 
economic evidence on the influence of instability on aid effectiveness.  
 
A main difference between our methodology and that of the authors of the previously 
mentioned four studies is that they all aggregate project data to the national level to obtain 
average economic rates of return or rates of success, while we run our regressions at a micro 
economic level using each project as an observation. This allows us to directly use a larger part of 
the available information: our explained variable is the outcome rating of the projects which 
focuses on the achievement of development objectives. Given that the outcome is a six scale 
notation, ranging from "very unsatisfactory" to "very satisfactory", our econometric model is an 
ordered logit. The success of each project is explained by the characteristics of the project 
(sector…), initial characteristic of the countries at project implementation (level of GDP, 
education, aid or institutions) and average characteristics of the countries during the realization of 
the project (level of exports, variability of exports…). Nonetheless, as a robustness check, we also 
aggregate the data to the country-level to confirm that the results are not sensitive to a change in 
the methodology.   
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we examine the consistency 
between the macro economic finding that aid dampens the negative effects of instability and the 
micro evidence of a lower decline of the success of aid projects (when aid increases) in an 
unstable environment: the stabilizing impact of aid is considered as a positive externality of aid 
projects. In section 3 we present our econometric model of the determinants of the success of 
projects where the macro economic variables of interest are the instability of exports, the amount 
of aid, and a variable multiplicative of the two previous ones likely to capture the stabilizing 
impact of aid. Section 4 is devoted to the estimation of the model and to the presentation of the 
results, the robustness of which is then checked.  
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2 - Aid effectiveness and vulnerability: from the macro to the micro level 
 
In cross-country studies, Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001, 2004) provided evidence that a 
worse external environment (measured by climatic and trade shocks) increases the impact of aid 
on growth and Collier and Dehn (2001) found that the adverse effects of an extreme negative 
export price shock can be mitigated through an increase in aid. Nevertheless, at a micro economic 
level there is no empirical evidence to support this statement yet. On the contrary, people who 
carry out development projects would state that instability hinders the success of the projects. 
After stressing the advantages of a micro economic study, we will analyze the reasons for this 
apparent paradox. 
 
Benefits from using micro economic data on the success of projects 
 
Macro economic studies that analyze aid effectiveness through the impact of international 
aid on growth face some well known difficulties. First, growth is not the only objective of aid. 
Other objectives, like poverty alleviation or increasing education, could be considered more 
legitimate, but most of the macro economic studies are limited to the impact of aid on growth 
because of a lack of other reliable and frequently available indicators of economic development. 
Now since we have seen that economic instability can increase poverty through growth as well as 
directly, estimating the cushioning effect of aid only on growth would lead to an underestimation 
of this effect. Secondly, macro economic studies can usually capture only the short or medium 
term effects of aid yet we would not expect an education project, for example, to have an impact 
on growth for many years to come.  
 
To some extent, these difficulties can be avoided using micro economic data. In this 
paper, our explained variable is the outcome of the projects, based on three criteria: relevance of 
the objectives, efficacy and efficiency of the projects. The relevance of the projects refers to all 
the development priorities defined by the receiving country and the World Bank rather than only 
the impact of aid on economic growth. These data also account for the long term effects of aid 
since the benefits are actualized for each project. Furthermore the use of a micro economic 
dependent variable explained by macro-economic variables limits the risk of endogeneity:  the 
risk of reverse causality is reduced if we suppose that a project is usually too small to influence 
the characteristics of a country; however, because aid could be correlated with some unobserved 
variables, the endogeneity of aid has to be tested.  
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Nonetheless, as we will see, these advantages come at a cost: not all the effects of aid can 
be perceived at the project level. This is the reason why the success of projects has to be 
explained not only by characteristics of the country traditionally included as explanatory variables 
(such as income per capita or quality of institutions), but also by variables reflecting “external 
effects” of aid volume on the success of projects, which we now consider. 
 
Taking into account the decreasing returns of aid 
 
         Decreasing returns can be assumed for aid as for other expenditures. However there also 
could be some threshold below which the marginal return is increasing, giving some legitimacy to 
the big push thesis. In macro economic works examining the aid and growth relationship, 
decreasing marginal returns to aid have been examined through a possible negative coefficient on 
the squared aid level (Collier and Dollar 2001) and have been a matter of debate (Hansen and 
Tarp, 2001), while few evidence have been made of increasing returns (with the exception of 
Gomanae et al. 2003 who found the existence of a threshold below which aid would have no 
effect). In our micro economic study of the determinants of the success of projects, as in Dollar 
and Levine (2005) decreasing (increasing) returns will be captured through a negative (positive) 
coefficient of the aid level. Possible thresholds of successively increasing, then decreasing returns 
could be tested though the coefficients on the level of aid and its square value.  
 
The negative impact of instability evidenced both at the macro and micro level 
 
There is now a relative consensus about the negative effects of economic instability on 
growth and poverty reduction. Both aspects are considered in Guillaumont (2006); main 
evidences on the effects on growth include Ramey and Ramey (1995), Hnathovska and Loayza 
(2004). At a micro economic level, risk averse agricultural producers might refuse to adopt more 
profitable but riskier techniques, or can forgo educating their children following a negative shock. 
At a macro economic level, the main channels through which exogenous sources of economic 
instability hinders growth include its transmission to the real exchange rate, to public finance, 
resulting in chronic inflation and public indebtedness, or to the instability of public investment, 
leading to a lower average rate of return (Guillaumont et al. 1998).  
 
Instability has been found to increase poverty not only through lower growth, but also 
through its effect on income distribution. (Agenor 2001, Laursen et al. 2004, Guillaumont 2006, 
Guillaumont and Korachais 2006). In most of these macro economic papers, reference is made to 
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the negative effects of shocks on households drawn from a large micro economic literature which 
emphasizes the direct effects of instability on poverty. Micro studies evidence that low income 
groups are more exposed than others because their incomes are less diversified; their lower 
human capital makes mobility across occupations and regions more difficult; their access to 
capital and financial markets is limited; their dependence on public services (especially health 
and education) exposes them to fiscal cuts. 
 
The success of projects conditioned on the stabilizing impact of aid 
 
Since the effect of instability on growth and poverty seems to be unambiguous, it can be 
expected that if aid has a macro economic stabilizing impact, its effectiveness would be higher in 
a vulnerable country. In a recent paper Chauvet and Guillaumont (2006) evidence that their 
previous finding of higher aid effectiveness in more vulnerable countries can be explained by the 
stabilizing impact of aid. They define “the stabilizing impact of aid” as the difference between the 
volatility of exports and the volatility of aid plus exports aggregate flow, and show that in most 
cases aid has a stabilizing impact with regard to exports. This holds even when aid is pro cyclical 
with regard to exports (positive correlation between the cycle of aid and the cycle of exports) but 
less volatile than exports (aid is finally stabilizing in about 90% of cases). As far as the result 
depends on the relative levels of the volatility of aid and the volatility of exports, when the 
volatility of exports is high, aid is more likely to be stabilizing.  
 
If aid effectiveness is higher in vulnerable countries then why do these countries have a 
lower success in development projects? The main reason is that the project evaluations do not 
include the total impact of the projects and particularly not the stabilizing impact. The latter is not 
always perceived because the main task of an evaluator is generally confined to appraise whether 
or not the objectives have been reached at a reasonable cost. To illustrate this, let us imagine the 
case of an irrigation project targeted to increase agricultural production. A negative shock 
(climatic, price shock…) can reduce production or its returns and thus harm the project. However 
the salaries given for the realization of the project might have been particularly beneficial in this 
period of shortfall, preventing malnutrition or children interrupting their education. These side 
effects would not be included in the rating if they were not initially part of the objectives. 
 
We can thus divide the total impact of a project into a direct impact and an indirect 
stabilizing impact. The direct impact, observed by the evaluator, is considered satisfactory when 
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the objectives have been achieved. This notation unavoidably reflects the fact that the objectives 
are less frequently achieved in an unstable environment. The apparent paradox rises from the fact 
that the stabilizing impact is not perceived at a micro economic level. Each project has a 
stabilizing impact that affects all the economy through the attenuation of the negative effects of 
vulnerability as described previously. This “side effect” can be interpreted as a positive 
externality: not included in the evaluation of the projects, it influences the whole economy, 
including the other aid projects carried out in the country. The size of this externality is likely to 
increase with the economic instability of the country. 
 
Since this externality is, by definition, not included in the rating, how can we evaluate it? 
Each project evaluation does not capture its own externality however it captures the externalities 
of all the other projects and all aid received by the country that brought an environment more 
favorable to the achievement of the projects. In vulnerable countries, the existence of a positive 
externality will thus lead to an increase in the returns to scale that will contrast with the otherwise 
likely decreasing returns of aid due to the limited absorptive capacity of the receiving country. 
 
3 - Designing a conditional model of the success of the projects 
 
Combining decreasing returns and cushioning effect of aid at the project level 
 
Figure 1 summarizes our hypotheses concerning the observed outcome of the projects. It 
represents the success of the projects depending on the level of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) for a vulnerable and a stable country.  
 
2 Unstable country 
1 
Aid / GDP O 
Success 
rate of 
projects 
Figure 1  Success rate, aid and vulnerability 
Stable country 
x
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In the stable country, as well in an unstable one, the slope of the curve is negative 
indicating a limited absorptive capacity: higher amounts of aid are hard to manage and result in a 
decrease in the success of the projects. Instability has two different effects on the success of the 
projects, as shown on figure one: the downward shift (1) indicates that vulnerability harms the 
projects, but the lower slope of the curve (2) represents the cushioning effect of aid. Hence when 
aid increases, the difference the success of the projects between stable and unstable countries is 
reduced. The cushioning impact may be so high that it fully compensates for the initially lower 
success of projects. We shall see that, in the most vulnerable countries, aid might even have 
increasing returns to scale.  
 
The intersection point (x) is the level of aid that totally compensates for the negative 
effects of vulnerability so that the chances of success of a project become equal in a stable and an 
unstable country. Once aid exceeds this point, it could be supposed that a further increase in aid 
would have a similar impact in the outcome of projects in both countries. Until this point aid 
increase makes the chances of success of the  projects in an unstable country closer to what it is in 
a stable country due to the cushioning effect of aid. 
 
From these hypotheses, we can deduce our econometric model. The explained variable is 
the success rate of the projects. We expect that vulnerability is harmful to the projects, the level 
of aid might also have a negative effect if the country has a limited absorptive capacity, but the 
multiplicative variable (Aid * Vulnerability) should have a positive impact on the success of the 
projects showing that when a country is vulnerable, aid dampens the shocks and therefore reduces 
the negative impact of vulnerability.  
 
Source of the data and measurement of instability 
 
Our database includes all the projects that have been funded by the World Bank. Among 
these 6954 projects, 4701 projects started between 1981 and 2002, our period of study. This 
number goes down to 4597 if we eliminate projects that were dispersed in more than one country. 
In the main equation, 2894 projects will be preserved after elimination of the projects of which 
some data are not available. 
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In our model, the explained variable is the outcome, which is a measure of project 
success provided by the IEG. The outcome rating, ranging from "very unsatisfactory" to "very 
satisfactory", is based on three criteria:  
- The relevance of the objectives: Are the objectives of the project consistent with the 
strategy of the World Bank and the development priorities of the country? 
- The efficacy: Were the objectives achieved? 
- The efficiency: Were the objectives achieved at least cost compared to alternatives? 
 
This outcome is thus considered as a proxy for the contribution of the project to the 
development of the receiving country. 
 
For each project, we need to measure an index of instability which reflects the 
vulnerability of the receiving country for the duration of the project. The variability of exports is 
used because the cycle of exports is likely to be affected mainly by exogenous shocks such as 
climatic or price shocks. We first compute an annual index of instability: following the method 
used by Ramey and Ramey (1995), each year, we calculate the standard deviation of the growth 
rate of exports during the four last years plus the year in question. Secondly, to obtain the index 
of instability of each project, we calculate the average of the index for each year during which the 
project was carried out and multiply it by the logarithm of the average share of exports on GDP 
during the same period in order to take into account the exposure to shocks.  
 
Descriptive presentation of the data  
 
A practical way to observe the combined effect of instability and aid on the success of the 
projects is to use a three dimension diagram. In the next figure, we compare the average success 
rate3 of the projects separated into nine groups. “Low aid” corresponds to the third of projects that 
have been carried out in countries receiving the lowest level of ODA (less than 1 % of GDP), and 
“high aid” to the upper third (more than 8 % of GDP). We similarly identified the upper, middle 
and lower thirds of projects according to the weighted export instability of the receiving country. 
 
                                                 
3 A project is considered successful if it has been rated at least moderately satisfactory. 
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We see in the diagram that for a low level of aid, the average success rate is 15 points higher 
in a stable country. However, in stable countries, this rate decreases sharply with the level of aid, 
showing a limited absorptive capacity, while in the most vulnerable group, the success rate seems 
to increase with the level of aid, or at least remains steady. Accordingly, when aid exceeds 8 % of 
GDP of the receiving country, the average success rate of the projects is higher in vulnerable 
countries. 
 
       The model to be estimated 
 
The model is the following: 
O = f ( A , I , A . I , Country variables, Project Variables, Year )  
With:  
- O = the outcome of the project 
- A = the Official Development Assistance as a share of GNI (expected negative 
coefficient, if aid has decreasing returns) 
- I = the economic instability, measured by the variability of exports weighted 
by the share of exports on GDP (expected negative coefficient) 
- A*I = the dampening effect of aid with regard to instability (expected positive 
coefficient). 
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- Country variables = the macro economic control variables that are suspected to have an impact 
on aid effectiveness: log of the rate of exports during the project4, initial level of education and 
quality of institutions. 
- Project Variables = the project related control variables: sector of the project, a dummy for 
IDA/IBRD, and a dummy for Investment/Adjustment loans. 
- Year = year dummies. 
All these variables are described in appendix A.   
 
4 –Estimation and main results 
 
Treating aid endogeneity  
 
Since the amounts of ODA is not provided randomly, and can be correlated to some 
unobserved variables, we need to check for the absence of endogeneity of aid. Therefore it is 
necessary to find instruments which influence the level of aid, but not the success of the projects. 
When the instruments, as often used in the growth literature,  are based on the characteristics of 
the receiving country (Boone 1996, Burnside and Dollar 2000), they are not satisfactory because 
they may have a direct impact on the outcome (either the growth rate or the success of the 
projects). For that reason it is preferable to use instruments based on the characteristics of the 
donors, as done by Tavares (2003), but with a relatively low explanatory power (similar 
instrumentation, although augmented, is used by Chauvet and Guillaumont 2006). Still relying on 
donor variables, we here use another set of instruments, which appears to be efficient.  
 
For each receiving country, Tavares (2003) multiplies the level of aid of the main donors by a 
geographical and cultural proximity index. We replace his proximity index by another one based 
on the composition of the donors for each recipient; our instruments are calculated as follow:  
- we have selected four main groups of donors5; 
- we calculate for each combination receiver/group of donors a proximity index equal 
to the share of aid from this group of donors in the total aid given to the receiver 
during the last period (four years before); 
                                                 
4 Controlling for the log of the share of exports on GDP is necessary because it has been used to calculate 
the vulnerability index and we want to isolate the impact of openness from the effect of instability. 
5 The four groups are 1-the IDA  2-the European Community 3-the United States, 4-the four main 
European donors (France, Germany, United Kingdom and Netherlands). 
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- the aid of each receiving country is instrumented by four variables (one per group of 
donors): its proximity index with each group of donors is multiplied by the relative 
increase in the amount of aid granted by this group of donors during the last four 
years. 
 
The choice of these instruments relies on two main assumptions: 
- the total level of aid granted by the donors is not influenced by the needs of only one 
receiver, but rather depends on the choices and constraints of the donors; 
- when a donor increases its aid, it will tend to give more to those to which it gave 
during the preceding years. 
One thus expects that, ceteris paribus, the aid received by a country increases when the 
aid given by its main donors increases.  This increase can be considered as exogenous. These four 
instruments (one per group of donors), calculated for each receiver, are used to instrument ODA. 
 
Using these instruments, we carry out the test of Nakamura and Nakamura. In order to 
avoid a repetition of identical observations when several projects were implemented in the same 
country during the same period, we use macro economic panel data, pooled by periods of four 
years from 1980 to 1999. Our tests confirm the validity of our instruments and the hypothesis of 
aid exogeneity cannot be rejected6. 
 
Main results: the success of aid projects in vulnerable countries 
 
Regression 1.1 shows the results of the model presented in section 3. This regression will 
always be referred to as the main regression. Before commenting on our variables of interest, we 
see that trade and the logarithm of GDP have no significant effect. We also notice that 
surprisingly the quality of the institutions as measured by the ICRG index has no significant 
effect on the success of the projects whereas education has a significant positive effect. These 
results are in contradiction with the findings of Isham and Kaufmann (1999) and Dollar and 
Levin (2005).  
 
                                                 
6 In the instrumental equation, the Wald test confirms the joint significance of the instruments at 1%. The 
residue, introduced in the structural equation, is not significant (t statistic = 0.79). Finally the Sargan test 
did not reject the validity of our instruments (p-value = 0.73). 
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As expected, we see in regression 1.1 that the instability of exports significantly reduces 
the success of the projects. According to our results, for a country with each variable equal to its 
average in all the projects, one standard deviation higher on the variability of the exports 
corresponds to a 10 percentage point lower probability of success7. 
 
We also perceive the existence of a limited absorptive capacity of aid since the level of 
ODA has a negative impact on the success of the projects. However, because the coefficient in 
front of the interaction term is positive and significant at 1%, we cannot reject our hypothesis that 
aid has a cushioning impact which increases its effectiveness in vulnerable countries.  
 
Below we use predicted values from the last equation to illustrate the probability of 
success of the projects related to the level of aid in two countries with identical characteristics 
(each variable is equal to its average in all the projects), except that one country has a low 
variability of exports (25th percentile) and the other has a high variability of exports (75th 
percentile). 
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We see that for a low level of ODA, the predicted success of the projects is 12 percentage 
points lower in the unstable country. This is a micro economic confirmation of the considerable 
negative impact of instability on the economy.  
 
                                                 
7 We considered a country receiving a level of aid close to 0% to exclude the cushioning effect of aid. 
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Both countries have a limited absorptive capacity of aid, represented by the negative 
slope of the curve. However in a vulnerable country, the decrease in the return to projects is 
slower because of the stabilizing effect of aid which partly compensates for the effects of a 
limited absorptive capacity. According to our results when the ODA reaches 16% of the GNI of 
the receiving country, the negative effect of instability is totally compensated for. Hence, each 
percentage point of ODA on GNI reduces on average 6%8 of the negative effect of vulnerability 
(regardless of the level of instability). 
 
To better understand these results, we can imagine that an education project is the only 
project in a very unstable country; then after a negative economic shock, the deterioration of the 
health status, the infrastructure, and the agricultural productivity will all impede children’s 
education. Conversely, if the country receives enough international aid at the time of the shock, 
then we can expect that projects will be carried out in most of the sectors and bring a higher 
macro economic stability, which is beneficial for the government’s projects as well as for the 
country’s growth and development.  
 
The cushioning effect of aid tested through the sustainability of projects 
 
We argue that, in a vulnerable country, the success of the projects increases with the level 
of ODA because of the cushioning effect of aid. In order to check this hypothesis, we now use the 
sustainability of the projects instead of the outcome. The sustainability is another project rating 
provided by the IEG, rating the resilience to risk of net benefit flows over time. If our hypothesis 
is correct, one would expect that in a vulnerable country, the sustainability is weaker but more 
ODA results in a higher sustainability. Stated another way, vulnerability and ODA should 
influence sustainability of the projects in the same way as they influence their outcome; which is 
what we find in regression 1.2. This corroborates our hypothesis that international aid is more 
effective in a vulnerable country because of its stabilizing effect. 
 
Results meaningful not only for aid funded projects  
 
When we say that each percentage point of ODA on GNI reduces on average 6% of the 
negative effect of vulnerability, do we mean the negative effect of vulnerability on the World 
Bank’s projects, on aid financed projects, on all the country government’s projects or even all the 
                                                 
8 If a level of ODA equal to 16% of the GNI reduces 100% of the negative effects of aid, then on average 
each percentage point of ODA on GNI reduces 6% of the negative effects of aid. 
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economy? For a more comprehensive discussion on this question, see Isham Kaufmann and 
Pritchett (1997) who studied the impact of the quality of country governance on the economic 
rate of return of the projects. As the authors state, there is very little reason to expect World Bank 
financed projects to be chosen very differently from other donor agencies, so we can reasonably 
extend our result to all aid financed projects.  
 
Can we extend our results to all the country government’s projects? Fortunately, we can 
divide the World Bank’s funded projects into those funded by the IDA, which are included in 
international aid, and those funded by the IBRD at the market rate which are not included in 
international aid. In regression 1.3 and 1.4 we see that, keeping only the IBRD funded projects, 
the previous results remain steady: aid attenuates the negative effect of instability on the success 
of the projects. We can thus presume that our results apply not only to aid funded projects, but 
also to the rest of the country government’s projects. Nonetheless, for diverse reasons provided 
by Isham et al. (1997), there could be a “cream skimming” in the choice of the projects funded by 
the World Bank. This could lead to a higher average success of the projects, but it would belie our 
conclusions only if it also leads to projects that are affected very differently by vulnerability and 
the level of aid.  
 
Can we extend our results to the rest of the economy of the receiving country? It seems 
very difficult to provide a reliable answer to this question, but we have no reason to expect the 
stabilizing effect of aid to affect only the public sector. Moreover the combination of the micro 
economic evidences that we provided in this paper and macro economic evidences (Guillaumont 
and Chauvet 2001, Chauvet and Guillaumont 2004) seems to confirm the existence of a 
stabilizing effect of aid that can noticeably improve the welfare of all the receiving country’s 
population.  
 
5 - Additional results and robustness checks  
 
As these findings have never been observed at a micro economic level before, it is 
necessary to check the statistical robustness of our results through different tests. In tables 2 to 5 
we carry out a number of robustness checks, none of which rejects our main results. 
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Removing education and institutions, thus extending the sample 
 
Although the level of education and the quality of the institutions seem to be key 
elements that could explain the success of the projects, as a robustness check, we remove them 
for two reasons. First, they can be channels through which instability influences the outcome of 
the projects. Instability, if related with previous level of instability, might have reduced the level 
of education, resulting in a lower success. Excluding this indirect effect would lead to an 
underestimation of the impact of vulnerability on the project’s success. Secondly each one of 
these variables is not available for every country every year, so removing them adds a lot of 
observations to our regressions and thus reduces the risk of selection bias.  
 
In regression 2.1 and 2.2, we see that removing the education and institution variables 
have lessened the significance of the coefficient in front of the multiplicative variable, but 
generally do not change our main conclusions. We note that institutions are still not significant 
when we remove the education variable hence the lack of significance of the institution variable 
was not due to its correlation with education. In regression 2.2, we have 4185 projects, which is 
more than 90% of the projects that were carried out in no more than one country during our 
period of study, we can thus presume that the risk of selection bias is very low. 
 
Some project related control variables have been added to make sure that we compare 
similar projects in different countries: the sector of the project (one dummy per sector), a dummy 
for IDA/IBRD, and a dummy for Investment/Adjustment loans. In regression 2.3, we see that 
removing them has very little impact on our results. 
 
Including other control variables related to instability 
 
The impact of economic instability on the projects is expected to vary with the source of 
instability. Hence, an alternative interpretation of our results could be that when economic 
instability is due to political instability or to the fact that a country is an important oil exporter, 
the donors would give less aid to these countries considering that these sources of instability are 
more harmful for the projects than economic instability9. This would explain why the coefficient 
in front of the instability is negative while the coefficient in front of the multiplicative variable is 
                                                 
9 We can expect aid to be less effective in a politically unstable country because of the lack of institution 
able to make an effective use of aid, and in an important oil exporter because the need for foreign currency 
would be lower. 
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positive. Even though our test confirmed the exogeneity of aid; in regression 2.4, we test this 
interpretation against our first interpretation by adding two control variables: the proportion of 
years of war in the total number of years in the country during the duration of the project, and the 
average fuel exports as a percentage of merchandise exports. As expected these two variables 
have a negative impact on the success of the projects, however they do not noticeably alter the 
results on the impact of ODA related to vulnerability; thus we cannot reject our first 
interpretation.  
 
World Bank loans and credits instead of Official Development Assistance 
 
It might seem inappropriate that we use the ODA to explain the success of projects which 
are not all part of the ODA: as mentioned before, since the loans granted by the IBRD are at the 
market rate, they are not included in international aid. This criticism is relevant for the use of 
ODA as a control variable to estimate the limited absorptive capacity, except if we assume that 
concessionary loans are in competition with non concessionary loans then a higher level of aid 
can reduce the marginal return to projects funded by non concessionary loans. However it is less 
relevant for the multiplicative variable, because we argue that the stabilizing effect of aid should 
affect not only aid project but also the rest of the economy and especially the government 
projects.  
 
In regression 3.1 we apply the same model, replacing the ODA by the total amount of the 
loans provided by the World Bank to the country during the fist year of the project: 
 
O = f ( WB , I , WB * I , Country variables, Project Variables, Year ) 
 
With    WB = the total amount of the loans from the IBRD and IDA to the receiving country 
 
We can see that the total amount of the loans granted by the World Bank has a negative 
impact on the success of the Bank projects. This result can be interpreted as another symptom of 
the limited absorptive capacity of capital of the receiving country, but it might also reflect the 
limited management capacity of the World Bank and its agency in the country. Besides we see 
that once again, the coefficient in front of the multiplicative variable is significant at one percent, 
which confirms the existence of a stabilizing effect of aid, higher in more unstable countries. 
These results mean that even if the World Bank was the only agency that reallocates more 
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assistance toward unstable countries, it should be effective because of the stabilizing effect of this 
external source of funding.  
 
 
Giving the same weight to each country 
 
Because the number of projects per country is divided very unequally, one or a few 
countries could by themselves have a major influence on the results. In order to give the same 
weight to each country, in regression 3.2 each observation is weighted by 1/p; with p = proportion 
of projects carried out in the country in the total number of projects included in the regression. 
The results show that giving the same weight to each country does not alter our main conclusions. 
 
Controlling for the non observed heterogeneity of the countries 
 
Because we need the variance between countries to lead to conclusions about aid 
effectiveness and aid allocation, we did not use fixed effects in our main regression. Nevertheless 
our results could be influenced by the unobserved heterogeneity between countries. For this 
reason, we add fixed effects: in regression 3.3 we can see that our results remain significant and 
relatively stable when we use only the variance within countries.  Therefore our results not only 
points out that more aid should be given to the most vulnerable countries, but also that more aid 
should be given to a country when it is exposed to more instability.  
 
Modification of the calculation of the variability of exports 
 
We now run the same regressions as the main one, except that we change the calculation 
of the variability of exports. Following Bulir and Hammann (2001, 2003), Pallage and Robe 
(2001) and Rand and Tarp (2002), and as done in Chauvet and Guillaumont (2006), we use an HP 
filter10 (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) to extract the trend component of the logarithm of the 
exports (in constant dollars). The yearly variability of exports is then equal to the average 
deviation from the trend during each one of the four previous years plus the year in question. 
Similarly to our first method, the average variability for the duration of the project is weighted by 
the logarithm of the average share of exports on GDP during the same period to take into account 
the exposure to shocks. 
                                                 
10 We chose a smoothing parameter of 6.25 following the value recommended by Ravn and Uhlig (2002) 
on annual data.  
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In regression 4.1 to 4.4, we use the new calculation of variability of exports as a measure 
of economic instability. In the reproduction of the main equation as well as in the robustness 
checks, the impact of economic instability on the success of the projects is negative, and the 
coefficient in front of the multiplicative variable is significantly positive. Thus our results are 
robust to a modification of a measurement of the variability of exports; however, the impact of 
the stabilizing effect is now smaller: now each percentage point of ODA on GNI reduces on 
average 3.5% of the negative effect of vulnerability. 
 
Macro economic regressions 
 
In this paper, the unit of observation has always been each project funded by the World 
Bank. We will now aggregate these observations by country and by four year periods to obtain 
average rate of success of the projects. The explained variable is equal to the average rate of 
success of all the projects carried out in the country during the period11. In regression 5.1 we run 
the same model as the one of the main equation pooling panel data from 1980 to 1999 with the 55 
countries for which the data are available. In the following regression of table 5, we present the 
results with country fixed effects: we find evidences of the existence of a stabilizing effect of aid 
with a coefficient in front of the multiplicative variable significant at 5% and 10% with fixed 
effects. We also note that this time, using the same method as Isham and Kaufmann (1999) or 
Dollar and Levin (2005) we find similar results: the quality of institutions significantly improves 
the success of the projects.  
 
 
                                                 
11 When a project is divided into two or more periods, its rating is divided into these periods proportionally 
to the duration of the project in each period.  
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7 - Conclusion 
 
Some macro economic studies have shown that economic instability increases aid 
effectiveness or in other words that aid lowers the negative consequences of instability, because it 
dampens the shocks. This paper brings a micro economic confirmation of these results. It 
evidences that aid has a stabilizing effect, which is not directly perceived by the evaluators of 
each project since it cannot be easily observed at a micro economic level. Indeed the vulnerability 
of a country harms the success of the projects, but this is less when the level of ODA received by 
the country is high, which leads to the conclusion that aid reduces the negative effects of 
economic instability. These results substantiate the macro economic findings and provide further 
support that more aid should be given to vulnerable countries because it can dampen the negative 
effects of shocks. It can be done by taking into consideration a measure of vulnerability in the 
criteria used for aid selectivity, as suggested elsewhere (Amprou et al. 2006, Guillaumont 2006). 
 
These results have not been rejected by the various robustness checks that we carried out 
but the size of the cushioning effect of aid can vary considerably with the choice of the model. 
Nonetheless, since we provided elements in favor of the idea that this stabilizing effect of aid 
extends to all the government expenditures and to some extent to the rest of the economy, the 
stabilizing impact of aid seems far from being negligible.  
 
Our findings also raise the need for further studies on aid effectiveness in vulnerable 
countries. Because managing projects in an unstable environment is difficult, it is essential to take 
into consideration the vulnerability of the country during the conception of the projects: for 
example, some project performance assessment reports of the World Bank (2000) recommend 
more flexible short-term and small projects and an emphasis on monitoring in unstable countries 
in order to handle the lack of predictability. More studies may be required on how to conceive 
and carry out projects adapted to an unstable environment.    
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Table 1: Main Results 
 
 
  All projects only IBRD 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 
  outcome sustainability outcome sustainability 
Log ODA (% of GDP) -0.3923 -0.333 -0.819 -0.567 
 (0.009)*** (0.028)** (0.000)*** (0.008)*** 
Variability of Exports -0.0167 -0.014 -0.023 -0.02 
  (0.000)*** (0.022)** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** 
ODA * exports variability 0.0058 0.004 0.013 0.007 
  (0.001)*** (0.072)* (0.001)*** (0.085)* 
Log exports (% of GDP) -0.0538 -0.089 0.128 0.142 
  (0.740) (0.667) (0.522) (0.572) 
Log GDP/capita -0.1142 -0.135 -0.116 -0.169 
  (0.515) (0.557) (0.461) (0.480) 
Institutions (ICRG) 0.0633 0.219 0.055 0.295 
  (0.576) (0.076)* (0.686) (0.044)** 
Education 0.1661 0.171 0.129 0.167 
  (0.014)** (0.063)* (0.075)* (0.100) 
Micro control variables Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2894 2696 1772 1656 
Pseudo R-squared 0.032 0.0702 0.04 0.0762 
Robust p values in parentheses    
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1% 
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Table 2: Robustness checks, less and more control variables 
 
 
  2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 
  outcome outcome outcome outcome 
Log ODA (% of GDP) -0.4511 -0.201 -0.378 -0.473 
 (0.004)*** (0.142) (0.010)** (0.002)*** 
Variability of Exports -0.0172 -0.006 -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.000)*** (0.014)** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
ODA * exports variability 0.0057 0.001 0.005 0.004 
  (0.000)*** (0.028)** (0.001)*** (0.028)** 
Log exports (% of GDP) 0.0136 0.002 -0.027 0.009 
  (0.905) (0.984) (0.857) (0.945) 
Log GDP/capita 0.0004 0.077 -0.07 -0.221 
 (0.998) (0.467) (0.705) (0.116) 
Institutions (ICRG) 0.072   0.059 0.03 
  (0.507)   (0.613) (0.783) 
Education   0.158 0.142 
   (0.020)** (0.013)** 
War       -0.574 
        (0.000)*** 
Oil exports (% of exports)   -0.006 
    (0.086)* 
Micro control variables Y Y N Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 3377 4185 2933 2482 
Pseudo R-squared 0.026 0.021 0.022 0.037 
Robust p values in parentheses    
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1% 
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Table 3: More robustness checks, World Bank loans, weights and fixed effects 
 
 
  3.1 3.2 3.3 
  outcome outcome outcome 
Log ODA (% of GDP)  -0.307 -0.315 
  (0.053)* (0.092)* 
Variability of Exports -0.029 -0.022 -0.013 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
ODA * exports variability  0.008 0.005 
  (0.000)*** (0.004)*** 
Log World Bank loans (% of GDP) -0.8067     
  (0.000)***     
WB loans * exports Variability 0.0091     
  (0.000)***     
Log exports (% of GDP) 0.0271 -0.291 -0.599 
  (0.853) (0.091)* (0.111) 
Log GDP/capita -0.1631 0.017 -0.629 
 (0.166) (0.920) (0.108) 
Institutions (ICRG) 0.0063 0.253 -0.304 
  (0.950) (0.011)** (0.008)*** 
Education 0.1623 0.16 0.266 
  (0.024)** (0.011)** (0.095)* 
Weighted12 N Y N 
Country dummies N N Y 
Micro control variables Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Observations 2814 2894 2894 
Pseudo R-squared 0.037 0.056 0.068 
Robust p values in parentheses    
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1% 
 
                                                 
12 In regression 3.2, each project is weighted by 1/p, with p = proportion of projects carried out in the 
same country in the total number of projects included in the regression. 
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Table 4: More robustness checks, variability of exports measured using H-P filter 
 
 
  4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 
  outcome sust outcome outcome 
Log ODA (% of GDP) -0.2279 -0.224 0.023 -0.389 
 (0.122) (0.207) (0.878) (0.096)* 
Variability of Exports (HP) -0.4349 -0.313 -0.365 -0.126 
  (0.002)*** (0.011)** (0.004)*** (0.337) 
ODA * exports variability 0.1282 0.073 0.115 0.094 
 (0.001)*** (0.032)** (0.000)*** (0.014)** 
Log exports (% of GDP) 0.151 0.086 -0.139 -0.913 
  (0.483) (0.749) (0.569) (0.016)** 
Log GDP/capita -0.182 -0.201 -0.084 -0.637 
 (0.143) (0.266) (0.578) (0.085)* 
Institutions (ICRG) 0.0349 0.194 0.162 -0.401 
  (0.750) (0.099)* (0.110) (0.002)*** 
Education 0.1807 0.162 0.201 0.179 
 (0.015)** (0.110) (0.012)** (0.313) 
Weighted13 N N Y N 
Country dummies N N N Y 
Micro control variables Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Observations 2664 2488 2664 2664 
Pseudo R-squared 0.026 0.021 0.044 0.068 
Robust p values in parentheses     
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1% 
 
                                                 
13 In regression 4.3, each project is weighted by 1/p, with p = proportion of projects carried out in the 
same country in the total number of projects included in the regression. 
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Table 5: More robustness checks, macroeconomic regressions 
 
 
  5.1 5.2 
  outcome outcome 
Log ODA (% of GDP) -0.0417 -0.0192 
 (0.251) (0.701) 
Variability of exports -0.003 -0.0021 
  (0.005)*** (0.018)** 
ODA * exports variability 0.0024 0.0014 
 (0.017)** (0.073)* 
Log exports (% of GDP) -0.0003 0.0348 
  (0.993) (0.709) 
Log GDP/capita -0.0018 -0.0743 
 (0.961) (0.396) 
Education 0.0239 0.0266 
  (0.103) (0.484) 
Institutions (ICRG) 0.0464 -0.029 
 (0.020)** (0.275) 
Country fixed effect N Y 
Period fixed effect Y Y 
Observations 240 240 
R-squared 0.211 0.151 
Robust p values in parentheses  
* significant at 10%;  ** significant at 5%;  *** significant at 1% 
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Appendix A: Variables description and sources 
 
Variable Description Source 
outcome 
Notation rating the extent to which the project’s major relevant objectives were 
achieved, or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. It is a 6 scale rating ranging 
from very unsatisfactory to very satisfactory. 
IEG 
sustainability Notation rating the resilience to risk of net benefits flows over time. It is a 5 scale rating ranging from highly unlikely to highly likely. IEG 
Log ODA (% of 
GDP) 
Log of Official Development Assistance during the first year of implementation of 
the project (% of GDP). WDI 
Variability of 
exports 
For each year, we calculate the standard deviation of the growth rate of exports 
during the four last years plus the year in question. We then calculate the average 
of this standard deviation for each year during which the project was carried out 
and multiply it by the log of one plus the average share of exports on GDP during 
the same period. 
Author’s 
calculations 
Variability of 
Exports (HP) 
For each year, we calculate the average deviation from the trend (given by the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter on the log of the exports) during each one of the four 
previous years plus the year in question. Identically, the average variability for the 
duration of the project is weighted by the logarithm of one plus the average share 
of exports on GDP during the same period. 
Author’s 
calculations 
Log exports (% 
of GDP) 
Log of one plus the average level of Exports of goods and services for the duration 
of the project (% of GDP). WDI 
Log GDP/capita Log of the Gross Domestic Product during the first year of implementation of the project (constant 1995 US$). WDI 
Institutions 
(ICRG) 
Average of the indices of corruption, bureaucratic quality and rule of law (each 
one rated from one to six) during the first year of implementation of the project. A 
high value corresponds to a better quality of institutions. 
ICRG 
International 
Country Risk 
Guide 
Education Average schooling years in the total population during the first year of implementation of the project. 
Barro & Lee 
2000 
War The proportion of years of war in the total number of years in the country for the duration of the project. CERDI 
Oil exports (% of 
exports) 
Average fuel exports as a percentage of merchandised exports for the duration of 
the project. WDI 
Log World Bank 
loans (% of GDP) 
Loans and credits from the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development) and IDA (International Development Association) during the first 
year of implementation of the project (% of GDP). 
WDI 
Micro economic 
control variables 
Those variables are directly related to the project. We use 3 kinds of micro 
economic control variables : 
- one dummy for each sector; 
- a dummy equal to 1 if it is an investment project and 0 for an adjustment 
project; 
- a dummy equal to 1 when the project is funded by IDA and 0 if it is 
funded by IBRD. 
IEG 
 
